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ABSTRACT 
 
This study considers the implications of excessive non-salary-based executive pay on capital 
structure during the years 2005 through 2007, directly preceding the 2008 stock market crash.  
The hypothesis proposes that for firms in the financial sector, executives awarded generous 
compensation packages, compared to salary, implemented a higher use of debt in their firm’s 
capital structure. The study examines data on 40 firms in the financial sector and 40 firms in the 
manufacturing sector to empirically test for a relationship between executive pay and leverage.  
Cross-sectional analysis of nine models reveals that compensation is a significant determinant of 
a firm’s total debt-to-total assets ratio for the financial sector, especially with the existence of a 
one- to two- year lag between the variables, while the manufacturing sector yielded no significant 
relationship.  These findings reveal sources of agency conflicts and behavioral biases within the 
financial sector during the three years preceding the financial collapse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he entire world felt the effects of the 2008 stock market crash, which was considered the worst economic 
meltdown in U.S. history since the 1929 catastrophe.  On September 29, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average plummeted 778 points, the largest one-day drop in history, leaving shareholders, businesses, and 
families in the harsh realities of a recession (Altman and Romero).  The financial sector experienced the greatest 
devastation of any other sector. 
  
 Although most financial institutions survived the market’s plunge or were fortunate enough to acquire 
funding from the government bailout, longstanding firms, such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, did not have 
enough cash to stay afloat.  Before the investment bank’s collapse, Bear Stearns’ executives boasted some of the 
largest compensation packages in the industry.  From 2002 to 2006, prior Bear Stearns CEO, Jimmy Cayne, received 
a total compensation package worth $156 million, with bonuses representing the most extensive share (Levisohn 
2008).  Many of these large financial firms offered higher executive pay and levels of debt usage than other firms in 
the sector, putting into question whether managers of these firms upheld their fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the 
firm’s shareholders. 
 
 This study seeks to address whether shareholder wealth maximization was challenged by compensation 
plans urging executives in the financial sector to over-lever.  Excessive compensation packages and risky business 
practices in the financial industry are analyzed for the three-year period directly preceding the 2008 stock market 
crash.  The hypothesis states that for the years 2005 through 2007, executives in the financial industry with higher 
non-salary compensation packages took on significantly more debt in their firm’s capital structure in comparison to 
manufacturing executives.  This line of research sheds light on agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, 
behavioral biases of managers, the efficient market hypothesis, the inefficiencies that caused the recent financial 
crisis, and the rebuilding of the current economy. 
 
 The paper first presents an overview of literature related to the topic while explaining some of the key 
economic theories that provide the foundation for this study.  The next section reviews the data set and methodology 
T 
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used to examine nine models investigating the relationship between executive pay and leverage.  The study uses data 
on manufacturing firms, as well as financial firms, to provide a comparison of other sectors to the financial industry.  
Finally, the paper provides an empirical analysis of the nine models and discusses the significance of compensation 
packages for determining a firm’s debt usage. 
 
THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In analyzing the many roles top executives play in a firm, one assumes the overall wellbeing of the firm 
depends on the preservation of the fiduciary duty defined by the agency relationship between managers and 
shareholders.  While shareholder wealth maximization should be the primary goal of executives, conflicts between 
managers and owners inevitably arise due to the varying interests of these two groups. John & John (1993) use a 
two-period model with heterogeneous agents to investigate the actions of managers given incentive contracts 
designed by the board of directors to maximize shareholder wealth.  The empirical findings show that precise 
alignment of shareholder interest to executive compensation is only optimal for firms using 100% equity financing.  
These results reveal the difficulty in upholding agency relationships for firms that implement high degrees of debt 
financing, illuminating inefficiencies created by incentive-based pay contracts for executives. 
 
 Further studies have analyzed whether a greater use of equity-based incentives compared to debt-based 
incentives help align shareholder and manager interests.  Zhang et al. (2008) use regression analysis in their study to 
test the effects of stock-based incentive options, firm performance, and CEO tenure on earnings manipulation 
activities of CEOs.  The results provide evidence that stock option grants do not aid in aligning manager/shareholder 
interests and can result in earnings manipulations.  Lam and Chng (2006) use an Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
of cross-sectional data to analyze some of the motivations for using stock option awards, such as value enrichment, 
tax benefits, risk-taking, signaling, and cash conservation.  Their results strongly support the argument that high-risk 
firms implement stock option grants to encourage high leverage.  Although boards of directors have thought that 
equity-based incentives uphold manager/shareholder relationships, these studies reveal that, when used in excess, 
this type of award has a negative impact on the alignment of manager and shareholder interests. 
 
 With agency theory providing a foundation for the debate over executive compensation plans, literature 
describing incentive contracts for executives uncovers motives for the crafting of capital structure.  While some 
managers may wish to take on a conservative approach to capital financing to reduce the company’s risk, large 
compensation packages provide an incentive for many executives to increase their firm’s leverage in hopes of higher 
rewards.  Berkovitch, Spiegel, and Ronen (2000) use a three-period cross-sectional model tracing managerial 
financing activity to test for the connection between shareholder/manager interests, capital structure, and 
compensation for firms that either retain or release their managers.  This study finds that executive compensation, 
leverage, and cash flow positively relate for firms that retain their managers.  Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) 
investigate the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies, finding a strong relationship 
between incentive compensation and firm performance.  Further, the results find that the volatility of returns 
positively relates to all components of executive compensation.  These findings suggest a strong positive correlation 
between the returns associated with high-risk transactions and executive pay. 
 
 The negative effects of excessive managerial pay on shareholder wealth maximization and firm 
performance evidence market inefficiencies that challenge the efficient market hypothesis.  Incentives dictating 
managers’ decisions reveal biases that the field of behavioral finance endorses as inevitable features of the financial 
world.  Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) use a multi-period agency model to examine the effects of executive 
stock-based compensation on a company’s short and long-term price valuation.  Allowing investors to have 
heterogeneous beliefs, the model allows for behavioral biases, permitting deviations in stock prices from their true 
worth.  Because of these price inefficiencies, companies altered CEO compensation plans to provide incentives to 
achieve short-term price goals, even at the expense of long-term values.  Short-term price goals are detrimental to a 
company’s long run success, evidenced by financial institutions such as Bear Stearns who failed to realize the 
implications of their high risk, high reward transactions. 
 
 Economists have begun to look at cognitive explanations of behavioral patterns such as overconfidence, 
anchoring, overreaction and herding to explain reactions of managers and investors.  A 2009 study by Gort examines 
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the idea of overconfidence to analyze the debate surrounding active management versus indexing.  Of the managers 
studied, the findings suggest that most adopt an overconfident attitude in their management performance.  The 
majority believe their plan to be above average in outperforming other pension plans (pp. 77-79).  Because 
overconfidence in managerial performance has been evidenced in many studies, the propensity of managers to take 
on high levels of debt in the capital structure, coupled with pressures from incentive plans, puts many firms in a 
riskier position than is constructive for maximizing firm performance. 
 
 Literature relevant to the current study is timely, widespread, and comprehensive.  The surprise of the 
financial crisis and the malpractice of some of the largest financial institutions left shareholders demanding answers 
and transparency about executive pay.  While the studies mentioned above all provide insight into the analysis of the 
relationship between executive compensation packages and capital structure, research has not yet examined the 
implications of compensation packages on leverage for firms in the manufacturing sector compared to firms in the 
financial sector.  Analyzing the results from these sectors will enhance current understanding of the causes of the 
2008 stock market crash and put into question the ethical practices of firms involved and the long-run implications 
of executive compensation strategies. 
 
DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
 The current study investigates whether incentive-based compensation plans serve as behavioral biases for 
top executives, affecting their decision-making process and actions.  Because a firm’s capital structure has a 
significant influence on the success or failure of a firm, the hypothesis predicts that executives in the financial sector 
who receive elevated incentive or performance-based pay take on riskier capital structures to reap these additional 
rewards.  Excessive debt usage may divert executives from upholding shareholder wealth maximization and provide 
a tendency to work towards short-term goals. 
 
 Figures on executive pay and leverage were collected for 40 firms in the financial sector and 40 firms in the 
manufacturing sector.  Using data from the three-year period 2005 through 2007, the study examines firm activity 
and strategies at the climax of the financial boom.  Only large-cap firms with revenues equal to or exceeding $5 
billion were used to better capture the affects of extreme executive pay, most prominent in large firms with enough 
capital to support significant compensation packages. 
  
 The hypothesis states that, due to the risk-increasing nature of incentive-based pay, executives with a more 
substantial compensation package compared to salary will implement a higher degree of debt usage in the firm’s 
capital structure.  In the basic model, 
 
(TL/TA)Y=β0 +β1(Compensation) Y –β2(Salary) Y, 
 
the amount of leverage in a firm’s capital structure (dependent variable) relates to Compensation and Salary 
(independent variables), where Y=1, 2 , or 3 corresponds to the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively.  The dependent 
variable reflects a firm’s total liabilities-to-total assets ratio, or debt ratio, which was calculated from Mergent 
Online’s company financials section.  Compensation reflects the total compensation minus salary as listed in the 
Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Summary Compensation Tables for the top three highest-paid 
executives in each company for a given year.  Data were collected on the three highest-paid executives to provide 
the most accurate representation of the managers in a company who hold the most influence over capital structure.  
Total Compensation reflects the sum of salary, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentive plan 
compensation, change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, and all other 
compensation.  Similarly, Salary reflects the sum of the salary of the three highest paid executives of a company for 
each year.  Because this study examines the effects of Salary and Compensation (measured in thousands and 
millions of dollars) on the debt ratio (measured as a fraction), the data were standardized to give each variable equal 
weight (Wooldridge 2009, p. 3). 
 
 The model predicts that Compensation will positively influence the debt ratio, while Salary will have a 
negative impact on the debt ratio.  Cross-sectional analysis of three models analyzing the data on the financial sector 
for 2005, 2006, and 2007 are compared to three models analyzing data on the manufacturing sector for those same 
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years.  Three additional models test for lag relationships between the independent and dependent variables.  The 
presence of a lag relationship is probable, because if an executive is told he or she will receive a significant bonus at 
the end of the year if a certain performance standard is reached, even if a riskier capital structure is proposed 
immediately, the change may not take place right away.  For example, an executive that decides to raise cash by 
distributing bonds may have to wait a significant period of time to float the bond issue.  The next section provides an 
empirical analysis of the nine models and discusses model reliability tests. 
 
RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
 The standardized data were analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to produce estimators for the 
nine linear regression models. 
 
Analysis of the Financial Sector 
 
 The OLS regression results for the financial sector yielded the following equations: 
 
2005      (TL/TA)1 =  0.313061(Compensation) 1 – 0.153505(Salary) 1, 
2006      (TL/TA)2 =  0.317282(Compensation) 2 – 0.038811(Salary) 2, 
2007      (TL/TA)3 =  0.173618(Compensation) 3 – 0.261934(Salary) 3. 
 
The contrasting signs of the beta coefficients of the independent variables support the hypothesis that 
Compensation will positively affect the debt ratio while Salary will negatively affect the debt ratio.  The p-statistics 
for the t-test reveal that Compensation is significant at the 1% level for all three models, demonstrating that 
Compensation is a highly significant determinant of the debt ratio.  Further, the p-values for the F-test reveal that 
Compensation and Salary are jointly significant at the 5% level for 2005 and the 1% level for 2006 and 2007.  
Although salary was found to be insignificant, this result is logical because most firms issue a base salary 
independent of what level of compensation the firm offers its executives, making the variation in the data for salary 
relatively small. 
 
 The R-squared values, 20.97%, 25.79%, and 25.04%, for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively, 
reveal that a relatively small portion of the variation in the debt ratio is explained by compensation and salary.  
However, narrowing in on the relationship between executive pay and financial leverage will naturally produce low 
R-squared values, because other factors are not taken into account.  Focusing on one of these factors allows the 
model to test whether excessive compensation packages provide an incentive for executives to use more leverage in 
financing activities, independent of other influences. 
 
 Tests of the Gauss-Markov assumptions were then conducted to determine the reliability of the model and 
any bias in the OLS estimators (Wooldridge 2009).  The White Test for heteroskedasticity revealed that the variance 
in the standard error terms is consistent for each of the models, reflecting that the homoskedasticity assumption is 
upheld.  Further, the Jarque-Bera Test for normality of the error terms and the test for multicollinearity upheld the 
model’s dependability.  The high statistical significance of Compensation as a determinant of leverage coupled with 
the support of the Gauss-Markov assumptions provides strong evidence supporting the hypothesis. 
 
Analysis of the Manufacturing Sector 
 
The regression results from the standardized data set for the manufacturing sector yield the following OLS 
regression equations, 
 
2005      (TL/TA)1 =  - 0.212522 (Compensation) 1 + 0.218392 (Salary) 1 
2006      (TL/TA)2 =  - 0.228096 (Compensation) 2 + 0.245767 (Salary) 2 
2007      (TL/TA)3 =  - 0.226588 (Compensation) 3 + 0.248599 (Salary) 3. 
 
The signs of the beta coefficients for the manufacturing sector reveal opposite results from those for the 
financial sector analysis.  These models suggest that Compensation negatively affects leverage, while Salary 
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positively influences leverage.  The t-test reveals that although Salary is statistically significant at the 5% level for 
each of the models, Compensation is not a statistically significant indicator of the debt ratio for any of the three 
years.  These results provide evidence that the positive relationship between Compensation and leverage is specific 
to the financial sector, and that within the manufacturing sector, a higher Salary-based compensation positively 
influences the amount of debt financing of a firm, reflecting an opposing relationship between the two sectors. 
 
 The R-squared values, 13.56% for 2005, 12.85% for 2006, and 10.64% for 2007 suggest a weaker 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables for the manufacturing sector, revealing that executive 
pay has a higher influence over capital structure within financial institutions compared to manufacturing firms.  
Although the models upheld homoskedasticity and normality of the error terms, multicollinearity of the independent 
variables was present in 2006, suggesting that Salary and Compensation were too highly correlated to 
simultaneously represent reliable predictors of the debt ratio for all three years.  Because the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions did not hold for all three models, no conclusions could be drawn about executive pay as a predictor of 
leverage for manufacturing firms. 
 
 These insignificant results for the manufacturing sector provide support for the hypothesis that the 
excessive compensation packages influenced executives in the financial sector to implement increased debt usage, 
while this relationship was not present in other sectors.  This result was evidenced by the increased devastation the 
financial sector experienced from the 2008 stock market crash compared to other sectors. 
 
Analysis of Lag Models within the Financial Sector 
 
 Three models tested for lag relationships between executive pay and debt usage in the financial sector.  The 
models regressed Compensation and Salary from 2006 on the debt ratio from 2007, Compensation and Salary from 
2005 on the debt ratio from 2006, and then a two-year lag model regressing Compensation and Salary from 2005 on 
debt from 2007.  The models will be referred to as Lag2007, Lag2006, and TwoLag2007, respectively.  The OLS 
regression equations are: 
 
Lag 2007 (TL/TA)3 =   0.325627 (Compensation) 2 - 0.067382 (Salary) 2 
Lag2006  (TL/TA)2 =  0.347092 (Compensation) 1 - 0.136838 (Salary) 1 
TwoLag2007       (TL/TA)3 =  0.350274 (Compensation) 1 - 0.183045 (Salary) 1. 
 
 Consistent with the hypothesis and the original three models for the financial sector, Compensation 
positively relates to the debt ratio and Salary negatively relates to the debt ratio.  While Salary remains an 
insignificant determinant of the debt ratio, Compensation proved even more significant with a one- or two-year lag.  
The p-stats for the t-test reveal that Compensation is highly significant at the 1% level for all three models.  Further, 
the F-test provides evidence that Compensation and Salary are jointly significant at the 1% level for the three 
models.  The R-squared values, 27.95% for Lag2007, 23.36% for Lag2006, and 25.49% for TwoLag2007 suggest a 
stronger relationship with the presence of a one- or two- year lag than the original financial sector models indicated.  
All three models possess homoskedasticity, normality of the error terms, and pass the test for multicollinearity of the 
independent variables, suggesting that the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold and the models are robust. 
 
 This study reveals empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that a relationship exists between top 
executive pay and leverage in the financial sector for the three-year period 2005 through 2007, especially when a 
one- to two- year lag is present.  The insignificant results from the manufacturing sector provide evidence that this 
relationship is specific to firms in the financial sector, providing insight into the effects of excessive compensation 
packages in the financial industry. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
 While the results produced significant figures supporting the hypothesis, this study recognizes restrictions 
to the analysis of this topic.  Time constraints and hand calculations involved in the data collection process limited 
the data set to 40 firms in the financial sector and 40 firms in the manufacturing sector.  Despite the small sample 
size, quantity was sacrificed so that figures collected on salary and compensation could reflect a combination of the 
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top three executives in each firm. While other studies boast larger data sets, most only examine the effects of CEO 
compensation plans on capital structure.  This study recognizes that a firm’s CEO may not carry the most influence 
over capital structure changes, proposing that the package offered to the three highest-paid executives provides a 
better representation of the executive impact on debt and equity changes. 
 
 Another limitation stems from the inability of the study to test for lag relationships greater than two years.  
Only the TwoLag2007 model was able to test for a two-year lag.  Although the study recognizes that changes in 
capital structure may take time to realize, this period may be greater than two years in many cases.  While the 
current study was limited to a three-year period, significant t-stats and F-stats indicated that Compensation was 
significant for determining the debt ratio within the financial sector, the primary goal of this thesis. 
 
 The results allow for a better understanding of the origins of risky business transactions among financial 
institutions, although other factors contributing to leverage usage must be accounted for as well.  Other studies have 
examined the contributions of executive age, length of employment within a company, the number of independent 
directors on a firm’s board of directors, production costs, executive pay-performance ratio, a firm’s age, and 
financial distress measures, to mention a few.  Adding more independent variables to the model would likely 
produce a higher R-squared value and allow for the analysis of additional factors that influence financial leverage.  
Further,
1
 a mutual relationship may exist between the independent and dependent variables in which changes in 
leverage may also influence the type of compensation packages executives receive.  It is also possible that in many 
cases a cause-effect relationship between executive compensation and capital structure does not exist at all; rather, 
other influences play into the amount of risk a firm takes on in its capital structure.  Factors relative to the period 
preceding the 2008 financial crisis include the effects of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the mortgage industry.  
Their propensity to buy riskier securities to stimulate the industry and produce more capital for both home buyers 
and financial firms may have led these institutions to increase their financial leverage due to the decrease in business 
risk supported by these government-sponsored enterprises. 
 
 A few extensions could be made from this study to be researched in the future.  While the study only 
analyzes data on large-cap firms, an interesting addition would be to examine whether a relationship between 
executive pay and leverage within the financial sector exists for small- and mid-cap firms as well.  A comparison of 
capital structure industry averages would also give insight into whether a relationship exists between firm size and 
debt and equity mix and which sectors diverge from or converge to industry averages.  Further, separating 
Compensation into debt-based incentives and equity-based incentives exhibits another interesting extension from the 
current study.  While firms often provide equity-based incentives in managerial compensation packages to help align 
executive and shareholder interests, excessive amounts of stock options may also provide incentives for managers to 
elevate share prices in the short run at the expense of long-term goals.  This extension would shed light on the actual 
implications of debt versus equity incentives on share prices and long-term firm performance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study addresses the risky business activities invoked by top executives in the financial sector leading 
up to the 2008 financial crisis.  Economists deemed the recent stock market crash as the worst financial catastrophe 
in the country’s history since the 1929 stock market collapse.  Executives of financial institutions gambled with 
leverage, using high levels of borrowed money to finance investment activity.  These risky transactions largely 
contributed to the credit crisis and the collapse of the stock market. This thesis examined the effects of executive 
compensation plans, one of the primary incentives urging executives in the financial sector to take on elevated levels 
of debt.  An empirical test examined the accuracy of the hypothesis, stating that within the financial sector, non-
salary compensation positively affects a firm’s debt ratio, while salary negatively affects the debt ratio.  These 
findings provide evidence supporting behavioral biases among managers and the presence of market inefficiencies, 
opposing the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  The results also raise issues relating to agency relationships between 
managers and shareholders, putting into question executives’ duty to maximize shareholder wealth.  Examining 
executive pay is crucial to the rebuilding of a financial industry that is based on integrity and sound business 
practices and to reestablishing trust between managers and shareholders. 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank John Howe, Missouri Bankers Chair and Professor of Finance at the University of Missouri, for the 
insights offered in the remainder of this paragraph. 
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